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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
CHAPTER 12 
PLAN. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for the sale of 
farm equipment collateral with the proceeds used to pay other 
unsecured creditors. The creditor with a priority lien on the 
equipment objected to that plan provision because it would not 
receive any of the proceeds or a lien in other property. The debtor 
argued that the loss of the collateral to the secured creditor was 
allowed because the creditor was oversecured with the remaining 
collateral in the estate. The court held that lien could not be avoided 
by the Chapter 12 plan against the wishes of the secured creditor 
because the creditor did not receive the collateral or proceeds 
and did not receive a lien in other property. The court also denied 
confirmation of the plan because the plan did not provide a market 
rate of interest on the unpaid secured claims. The debtor’s plan 
provided for an interest rate of 5.75 percent. The court noted that 
the minimum allowable interest rate was the 20-year U.S. Treasury 
bond rate of 5.48 percent plus 2 percent for risk. Finally, the court 
rejected the debtor’s plan because its projections of income and 
expenses were not consistent with the historical income and 
expenses of the farm and other business operations; therefore, 
the plan was not feasible. The court held that the case was 
dismissed for unreasonable delay because the debtor had submitted 
eight plans over three years without success. In re Michels, 305 
B.R. 868 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 301 B.R. 9 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 2003). 
SECURED CLAIMS. A creditor had obtained a judgment 
against the debtor prior to the debtor’s filing for Chapter 12. The 
debtor’s plan provided that all judgments were to be paid as 
unsecured claims and the judgment creditor objected to the plan. 
The court held that, under Minnesota law, a judgment immediately 
became a lien against the debtor’s property. The court found that, 
even using the debtor’s valuation of assets, the debtor had 
sufficient equity after the other secured claims to satisfy the 
judgment lien; therefore, the court held that the judgment lien 
was a secured claim and had to be included as such in the Chapter 
12 plan. In re Anderson, 305 B.R. 861 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2004). 
CHAPTER 13 
PLAN. The debtors had purchased a truck with an installment 
loan with an interest rate of 21 percent. The debtors’ Chapter 13 
plan provided for payment of the secured portion of the debt at a 
9.5 percent interest rate and the creditor objected to the plan, 
arguing that the interest rate should be as provided in the 
installment agreement. The Bankruptcy Court approved the plan, 
holding that the protections of the bankruptcy proceedings justified 
a lesser rate. The District Court reversed, holding that the contract 
rate reflected the rate for a similar loan. The Seventh Circuit 
refined the District Court’s ruling by stating that the contract rate 
was entitled to be presumed to be the current market rate but 
allowed the debtors to provide evidence to rebut this presumption. 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected all three methods of determining 
the proper interest rate for installment payments under a 
bankruptcy plan. The court held that the interest rate should be 
used to insure that the secured creditor receive the present value 
of the claim. The court held that an interest rate of the national 
prime interest rate plus 1 to 3 percent for risk would give the 
secured creditor the present value of the secured claim. In this 
case, the risk factor was determined to be 1.5 percent, producing 
an interest rate of 9.5 percent. In re Till, 124 S. Ct. 594 (2004), 
rev’g and rem’g, 301 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2002). 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed the 1997 tax return on February 
10, 1998; however, the debtor reported only zeroes for each line 
of income, tax, credits and other taxes. The debtor did report tax 
withholdings and claimed a refund for all of the withheld taxes. 
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and claimed that the 1997 taxes 
were dischargeable. The IRS argued that, under Section 
523(a)(1)(B)(i), the taxes were not dischargeable because no tax 
return was filed. The court held that the debtor’s 1997 tax return 
did not constitute a return for purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i) 
because the filed return did not provide accurate information 
sufficient to determine what tax was due. In re Fondren, 305 
B.R. 918 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
CHECK-OFF. The U.S. Supreme Court has grant certiorari on 
a limited basis in the following case. The plaintiffs were livestock 
producers subject to the assessment of one dollar per head of cattle 
to be used by the USDA and the Cattlemen’s Beef Board for 
promotion of the beef industry, as provided by the Beef Promotion 
and Research Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. The plaintiffs challenged 
the law as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. 
The plaintiffs objected to the assessment because it paid for 
advertising for beef products, such as steak, which is not the 
product which the plaintiffs sold, live cattle. The court held that, 
under United States Department of Agriculture v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, aff ’g, 197 F.3d 221 (6th Cir. 2000), the 
assessment was a violation of the plaintiffs’ first amendment rights 
of free speech and association. The court made its temporary 
injunction permanent and prospective from July 15, 2002. The 
court also refused to issue a stay pending further appeal to the 
Eighth Circuit or appeal to the Supreme Court, citing the 
continuing harm to the producers who are under stress from 
economic and environmental conditions. The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed. See Harl, “Future of Commodity Check-Offs,” 12 Agric. 
L. Dig. 113 (2001); McEowen & Harl, “Beef and Pork Check-offs 
Ruled Unconstitutional; What Does the Future Hold for 
Agricultural Check-offs?” 14 Agric. L. Dig. 169 (2003). Livestock 
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Marketing Ass’n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’g, 
207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S.D. 2002). 
GRASSLAND RESERVE PROGRAM. The CCC has 
issued interim regulations implementing the Grassland Reserve 
Program authorized by the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002. 69 Fed. Reg. 29173 (May 21, 2004). 
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has issued interim regulations 
removing areas of Arizona and Texas from the list of regulated 
areas. 69 Fed. Reg. 27821 (May 17, 2004). 
ORGANIC FOODS. The AMS has rescinded proposed 
regulations, see 68 Fed. Reg. 18556 (April 16, 2003), which 
would have amended the USDA National List of Allowed and 
Prohibited Substances to reflect recommendations submitted to 
the Secretary by the National Organic Standards Board from 
June 6, 2000 through October 20, 2002. 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The decedent 
had owned a veterinary hospital and sold it on installment 
payments, including $1000 per month for an agreement not to 
compete. The estate  valued the remaining installments under 
the agreement at 75 percent of the total amount to be paid. The 
taxpayer received a one-third interest in the remaining monthly 
installments but did not report the payments as taxable income. 
The taxpayer argued that the installment payments received a 
step-up in basis of 75 percent of each payment. The court first 
held that the installment payments were income in respect of 
decedent because the payments were taxable as income if 
received by the decedent while alive. Secondly, the court held 
that, under I.R.C. § 1014(c), IRD does not receive an increase 
of basis as a result of the estate tax; therefore, the entire monthly 
payments received by the taxpayer had to be included in taxable 
income. Coleman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-126. 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED POWERS. The decedent 
had transferred assets to a family limited partnership in exchange 
for a limited partnership interest. The partnership agreement gave 
the decedent the power to designate a new general partner who 
did not owe a fiduciary duty to any partner. The trial court held 
that the assets were included in the decedent’s estate because 
the power to control the general partner was a power to control 
who received the benefits of the assets. The trial court also held 
that the transfer was not a bona fide sale because there were no 
arm’s-length negotiations and the decedent received no 
consideration for the transfer other than a “recycling” of the 
assets into a partnership interest. The appellate court reversed 
on both holdings. The appellate court held that the decedent had 
not retained sufficient control over the partnership because the 
decedent’s son had sole management powers. The court also 
held that the transfer of assets to the partnership was a bona fide 
transfer for adequate consideration because (1) the interests 
credited to each of the partners was proportionate to the fair 
market value of the assets each partner contributed to the 
partnership, (2) the assets contributed by each partner to the 
partnership were properly credited to the respective capital 
accounts of the partners, and (3) on termination or dissolution of 
the partnership the partners were entitled to distributions from 
the partnership in amounts equal to their respective capital 
accounts. The court noted that the transfer also had substantial 
business purposes, demonstrating the bona fide nature of the 
transfer.   Kimbell v. United States, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 60,486 (5th Cir. 2004), vac’g and rem’g, 2003-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,455 (N.D. Tex. 2003). 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayer was a 
tenant-shareholder in a cooperative housing corporation and 
claimed a share of the corporation’s real estate taxes as a 
deduction. In computing the taxpayer’s alternative minimum tax, 
the taxpayer also deducted the share of real estate taxes. The 
taxpayer argued that the deduction from AMTI was allowed 
because the deduction was not listed in I.R.C. § 56(b). The court 
disagreed and held that the taxpayer’s share of cooperative  real 
estate taxes were not deductible from AMTI. Ostrow v. Comm’r, 
122 T.C. No. 21 (2004). 
CORPORATIONS. 
REORGANIZATIONS. The taxpayer, a wholly-owned 
corporation, operated two businesses. The corporation determined 
that it was in its best interest to split the businesses into two 
corporations to split the product liability risks. The taxpayer 
formed a second S corporation by distributing the assets of one 
business to the new corporation in exchange for all of its stock 
which was distributed to the shareholder of the taxpayer. The 
new corporation also assumed all the liabilities associated with 
the assets it received. The IRS ruled that the reorganization 
qualified as an I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (type D) reorganization 
because the taxpayer had a valid business purpose for the 
reorganization.  Ltr. Rul. 200420024, Feb. 9, 2004. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On May 5, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in North Dakota were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of severe storms , flooding and 
ground saturation that began on March 26, 2004. FEMA-1515­
DR. Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to 
the disaster may deduct the losses on their 2003 federal income 
tax returns. 
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL INCOME. On May 11, 2004, the 
U.S. Senate passed legislation repealing the Extra-territorial 
Income Exclusion Act of 2000. See Harl, “The Extra-Territorial 
Income Exclusion Act of 2000,” 15 Agric. L. Dig. 25 (2004). S. 
1637. 
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IRA. The taxpayer received a distribution from an IRA in 
September 2002 and instructed a bank to deposit the money into 
a new IRA at the bank. The bank failed to make the deposit and 
the error was not discovered until October 2003. The taxpayer 
sought a waiver of the 60-day rollover requirement and the IRS 
granted the request for 60 days after the issuance of the letter 
ruling. Ltr. Rul. 200420034, Feb. 18, 2004. 
The taxpayer was retired, legally blind and subject to several 
health problems. The taxpayer received a notice from a bank 
that the taxpayer was required to make a distribution from the 
IRA. The taxpayer made a distribution from the IRA but took 
out too much. The taxpayer received a Form1099R within 60 
days of the distribution but the taxpayer’s son realized that the 
taxpayer had taken out too much. The son attempted to redeposit 
the excess funds into another IRA but was prevented by a call to 
active military duty. The taxpayer was unable to redeposit the 
excess funds and sought a waiver of the 60-day rollover 
requirement which was granted by the IRS. Ltr. Rul. 200421006, 
Feb. 23, 2004. 
The taxpayer received a distribution from an IRA and believed 
that the taxpayer had 90 days to rollover the distribution into 
another IRA. When the taxpayer attempted to make the rollover 
75 days after the distribution, the taxpayer learned that the rollover 
period was actually 60 days. The taxpayer sought a waiver of the 
60 day period which was granted by the IRS. Ltr. Rul. 
200421007, Feb. 23, 2004. 
The taxpayer requested a partial distribution from an IRA but 
the account trustee terminated the IRA and distributed the entire 
IRA to another account held by the taxpayer with the trustee 
brokerage. The taxpayer did not learn about the error until a Form 
1099R was issued more than 60 days after the distribution. The 
taxpayer requested a waiver of the 60-day requirement for the 
excess amount distributed, which was granted by the IRS. Ltr. 
Rul. 200421008, Feb. 23, 2004. 
The taxpayer owned an IRA which was invested in a mutual 
fund. The mutual fund was terminated and the taxpayer’s 
investment was sent directly to the taxpayer, resulting in a 
distribution from the IRA. The taxpayer did not receive any 
explanation about the distribution and did not realize that the 
distribution would result in tax unless the money was rolled over 
to a new IRA within 60 days. The taxpayer did not discover the 
error until more than 60 days after the distribution and sought a 
waiver of the 60-day requirement which was granted. Ltr. Rul. 
200421009, Feb. 23, 2004. 
The taxpayer received a distribution from a deceased spouse’s 
IRA as part of the distribution from the spouse’s estate. The 
money was placed in a savings account. When the taxpayer 
received a Form 1099R for the distribution showing the 
distribution as taxable, the taxpayer sought tax advice and learned 
about the 60-day rollover requirement. The taxpayer sought a 
waiver of the 60-day rollover requirement which was denied by 
the IRS because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate sufficient 
hardship that enforcing the 60-day requirement “would not be 
against equity or good conscience.” Ltr. Rul. 200421003, Feb. 
27, 2004. 
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INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The taxpayer owned a whole life 
insurance policy and surrendered the policy to the insurance 
company in exchange for a lump sum payment. The insurance 
company reported the taxable portion of the amount distributed 
by subtracting the premiums paid from the gross distribution 
amount. The taxpayer did not report either the gross distribution 
or net distribution and did not pay any tax on the distribution. 
The court held that the amount of the distribution that exceeded 
the amount of premiums paid was taxable under I.R.C. § 
72(e)(1)(A). Jensen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-75. 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, 
were employed in different towns. Because the husband was sight-
disabled, the wife had to drive the husband to his employment in 
one town and then drive to the town of her employment. The 
taxpayers claimed a deduction for the costs of the husband’s travel 
to and from work, arguing that at least some portion of the expense 
was eligible for a medical expense deduction. The taxpayers did 
not keep any written or other records to substantiate the mileage 
or other costs of the travel. The court held that the travel expense 
was not eligible for the medical expense deduction because the 
travel was not incurred as part of medical treatment. In addition, 
the travel expenses would not be allowable as a deduction for 
failure of the taxpayers to substantiate the mileage or other costs. 
Alderman v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-74. 
PARTNERSHIPS. 
CONVERSION TO CORPORATION. The taxpayer 
partnership was organized in state as an unincorporated entity 
that was classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes. The 
partnership elected to convert under a state law “formless 
conversion” statute into a state law corporation, effective January 
1. As a result of the conversion, the partnership was classified as 
a corporation for federal tax purposes. The IRS ruled that the 
partnership conversion would be treated the same as if the 
partnership elected to be treated as a corporation for federal tax 
purposes. Therefore, when unincorporated partnership is 
converted, under state law, to a corporation, the following steps 
were deemed to occur: unincorporated partnership contributed 
all of its assets and liabilities to the corporation in exchange for 
stock in the corporation, and immediately thereafter, the 
partnership liquidated, distributing the stock of the corporation 
to its partners. Rev. Rul. 2004-59, I.R.B. 2004-24. 
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayer owned and 
operated residential rental properties. The IRS disallowed most 
of the net operating losses under passive activity rules. The 
taxpayer presented spreadsheets created for trial and oral evidence 
for the number of hours spent on the rental properties during the 
tax year. The taxpayer was employed full time as a team manager. 
The court gave no credibility to the written evidence because it 
was not created as the work was done and failed to list the number 
of hours worked each day. The court also ignored the oral 
testimony as self-serving. Thus, the court held that the taxpayer 
failed to demonstrate that the taxpayer had worked more than 
750 hours on the rental activity in the tax year and the losses 
from the activity were passive losses. Nelson v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2004-62. 
95 Agricultural Law Digest 
RETURNS. The IRS has posted the following publication to 
its web site in the Forms & Pubs section: Publication 1600SP 
(Rev. 3-2004), Desastre Perdidas —Ayuda del IRS. The Spanish-
language publication explains federal tax treatment of disaster 
losses for individuals and business owners. It describes casualty 
losses, insurance coverage and where to get copies of financial 
records that were destroyed by the disaster. See www.irs.gov/ 
formspubs/index.html. These publications can also be obtained 
by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676). 
The U.S. Senate has passed the Tax Administration Good 
Government bill (H.R. 1528, Sen. 882) which provides for 
registration and testing of federal income tax return preparers 
who are not enrolled agents. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
June 2004 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 1.98 1.97 1.97 1.96 
110 percent AFR 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.16 
120 percent AFR 2.38 2.36 2.35 2.35 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.89 3.85 3.83 3.82 
110 percent AFR 4.28 4.24 4.22 4.20 
120 percent AFR 4.67 4.62 4.59 4.58 
Long-term 
AFR 5.2 5.13 5.10 5.08 
110 percent AFR 5.72 5.64 5.60 5.57 
120 percent AFR 6.25 6.16 6.11 6.08 
Rev. Rul. 2004-54, I.R.B. 2004-23. 
SALE AND LEASEBACK. The IRS has issued temporary 
regulations which provide that eligible debt under I.R.C. § 
263A(f) does not include a purchase money obligation given by 
the lessor to the lessee (or a party related to the lessee) in a sale 
and leaseback transaction under former I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) as 
enacted by ERTA. Accordingly, these obligations are excluded 
from the definition of eligible debt, and the interest accruing on 
the obligations is not subject to capitalization with respect to 
designated property under I.R.C. § 263A(f). The temporary 
regulations apply to interest incurred in taxable years beginning 
on or after May 20, 2004, except that, in the case of property 
that is inventory in the hands of the taxpayer, the temporary 
regulations apply to taxable years beginning on or after May 20, 
2004. However, taxpayers may elect to apply the temporary 
regulations to interest incurred in taxable years beginning on or 
after January 1, 1995, or, in the case of property that is inventory 
in the hands of the taxpayer, to taxable years beginning on or 
after January 1, 1995. For purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-
15(a)(2), the exclusion of purchase money obligations given by 
the lessor to the lessee (or a party related to the lessee) in a sale 
and leaseback transaction under former section 168(f)(8) as 
enacted by ERTA will be considered to be a reasonable position 
for the application of I.R.C. § 263A(f) in taxable years beginning 
before January 1, 1995. Consequently, a taxpayer changing a 
method of accounting for property that is not inventory in the 
hands of the taxpayer to conform to the temporary regulations 
may elect to include interest incurred after December 31, 1986, 
in taxable years beginning on or after December 31, 1986, and 
before January 1, 1995, in the determination of its adjustment 
under I.R.C. § 481(a). A taxpayer changing a method of 
accounting for property that is inventory in the hands of the 
taxpayer to conform to the temporary regulations must revalue 
its beginning inventory in the year of change as if the new method 
of accounting had been in effect during all prior years. 69 Fed. 
Reg. 29066 (May 20, 2004). 
NEGLIGENCE 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK. The plaintiff was 18 years old at 
the time of an accident which occurred while the plaintiff was 
bareback riding a horse owned by one defendant in a rodeo 
sponsored by another defendant. When the plaintiff drew the horse 
for the event, the plaintiff recognized the horse as one which had 
flipped on to its back during a bareback ride in a previous rodeo. 
The plaintiff discussed the horse with another contestant and 
decided that, because the horse had only done this once, the horse 
was probably safe to ride. However, during the ride, the horse 
flipped on to its back and injured the plaintiff. The defendants 
argued that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of riding the horse, 
no only from the general risks of bareback horseriding but also 
because the plaintiff had personal knowledge that the horse could 
flip on its back without reason. The plaintiff pointed to evidence 
that the owner was told not to enter the horse in a rodeo again 
because of the first flipping incident, but the court held that this 
evidence was not relevant to the issue of assumption of the specific 
risk assumed by the plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff’s 
action in negligence was barred by the plaintiff’s assumption of 
the risk. Burke v. McKay, 268 Neb. 14, 2004 Neb. LEXIS 86 
(2004). 
NUISANCE 
FOREST PRACTICES. The plaintiff was a ski club which 
owned cabins in forest land adjacent to forest land owned by the 
defendant. The defendant used its property for logging and the 
plaintiff claimed that the logging was a nuisance because it caused 
avalanches and erosion on to the plaintiff’s land. The defendant 
owned its land before the plaintiff purchased its parcel but the 
logging did not commence until after the plaintiff purchased its 
land. Both properties were zoned as forest land on which logging 
was permitted. The defendant’s purpose in owning the land had 
always been for the growing and harvesting of trees. The defendant 
argued that the logging of trees, under Wash. Code § 7.48.305, 
the Washington Right-to-Farm Act, was protected from nuisance 
suits so long as the logging method was consistent with good forest 
practices established prior to ownership of neighboring land 
affected by the logging. The court held that the growing of trees 
for future harvesting was a “forest practice” covered by the statute; 
therefore, the court held that the plaintiff’s action was barred by 
the statute. Alpental Community Club, Inc. v. Seattle 
Gymnastics Society, 86 P.3d 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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STATE REGULATION OF

AGRICULTURE

PACKER OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has vacated and remanded the case 
of Smithfield Foods, Inc. et al. v. Miller, 241 F. Supp.2d 978 
(S.D. Ia. 2003). See McEowen & Harl, “Iowa Ban on Packer 
Ownership of Livestock Ruled Unconstitutional,” 14 Agric. 
L. Dig. 17 (2003). The court ruled that the lower court failed 
to identify sufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose 
by the legislature in passing the law and failed to cite 
sufficient evidence that the law discriminated against 
interstate commerce. Smithfield Foods, Inc. et al. v. Miller, 
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10051 (8th Cir. May 21, 2004), 
vac’g and rem’g, 241 F. Supp.2d 978 (S.D. Ia. 2003). 
WAREHOUSES. The defendant was a licensed and 
bonded bean warehouse which had received notice by the 
Idaho Department of Agriculture (the department) that the 
defendant was declared failed because of an inability to 
compensate parties who stored commodities at the 
warehouse. The department then notified the defendant’s 
clients to file claims with the state and paid those claims. 
The department notified the defendant about the amount of 
the claims paid and requested comment or objection. When 
the defendant did not respond within 20 days, the department 
filed suit to recover the amount paid on the claims. The 
defendant objected to the method used to value the claims. 
The department filed for summary judgment, arguing that 
the defendant could not raise any objections to the claims 
because the defendant failed to object to the notice within 
20 days. The court upheld the summary judgment for the 
department because the defendant failed to provide evidence 
to support the claim that the notice was defective. State of 
Idaho v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 86 P.3d 503 (Idaho 2004). 
IN THE NEWS

BAN ON PACKER OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases 
involving the Dormant Commerce Clause (the Court 
consolidated the cases for review). The Dormant Commerce 
Clause consolidated case merits attention because last week 
the 8th Circuit vacated and remanded the Iowa case involving 
Smithfield’s challenge to the Iowa ban on packer ownership of 
livestock contained in the state’s anti-corporate farming law. 
See McEowen & Harl, “Iowa Ban on Packer Ownership of 
Livestock Ruled Unconstitutional,” 14 Agric. L. Dig. 17 (2003). 
The Dormant Clause consolidated case involves the question 
of whether a state regulatory scheme that treats in-state and 
out-of-state wineries differently so as to violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause can be saved under section 2 of the 21st 
Amendment (the case is unique in that section 2 of the 21st 
amendment allows the states to set up rules governing the 
importation of intoxicating liquor). Granholm v. Heald, 342 
F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003); Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics 
Service has issued farm employment figures as of May 21, 
2004. There were 1,077,000 hired workers on the nation’s 
farms and ranches the week of April 11-17, 2004, up 15 percent 
from a year ago. Of these hired workers, 825,000 workers were 
hired directly by farm operators. Agricultural service 
employees on farms and ranches made up the remaining 
252,000 workers. All NASS reports are available free of charge 
on the internet. For access, go to the NASS Home Page at: 
http:/www.usda.gov/nass/ 
PRICE FIXING. Cargill Inc. on May 19, 2004, won federal 
court approval for an agreement to settle for $24 million a 
class-action lawsuit that accused the company of conspiring 
to fix prices of high-fructose corn syrup. Reuters, May 20, 
2004. See also Harl, “Price Fixing in Agriculture,” 13 Agric. 
L. Dig. 121 (2002). 
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